In Arts. x.-xiv., the evils arising from the want of a feeling of responsibility, on the part of these hereditary holders of offices treated almost as sinecures, are laid out more in detail. The magistrate would allow himself to lose his temper on the bench, and bully the accused or the witnesses. He should remember that it was always possible that he himself might not always be the perfection of wisdom; that it was also possible that the prisoner in the dock, and the witness under cross-examination, were reasonable men (Art. x.). He should listen, therefore, to the opinions of others, should give his decisions with sobriety and fear, and be very careful to administer praise and blame in strict accordance with the results of a severe and impartial investigation (Art. xi.). He should be careful to levy no arbitrary taxes, on his own authority, in the district over which he was called to rule, so as not to provoke the people to resistance (Art. vii.). He should know the working of every detail of his own office, and the regularity or slackness of the members of his staff. If something had gone wrong, because a subordinate was absent from his post, the chief of the bureau must not excuse himself by saying that he did not know the man was absent. It was his duty to know it, and to provide for the public service being properly attended to (Art. xiii.). Mutual jealousies have often brought ruin upon a State. Saints and sages appear but rarely in the world; jealousy and envy are the main obstacles which hinder their more frequent development. And what would become of the government of a country without sages or saints? (Art. xv.). A sage or a saint, he continues, showing the identity of both Confucianist and Buddhist teachings in this respect, is one who sacrifices his own

will, and devotes himself to the service of others. This principle produces self-sacrifice in the governors, obedience in the people, and makes for peace and harmony (Art. xv.). It shows itself in the way in which orders are given.

For instance, Government has the right to demand a certain amount of forced labour from the people. But times and seasons must be observed. If the governor makes the people work for the State during the summer months, the farmer will suffer, and distress will ensue. If the governor exercises patience and self-control, and waits till winter comes there will be no friction (Art. xvi.). "Never act," he concludes, "on your own private initiative or authority; and never take any step of importance without consultation. In a doubtful case, consult the more" (Art. xvii.).

Such were the principal defects which Shotoku found in the administration of the country after he had had his hand at the helm of State for several years. For these evils he had two great remedies. The one was the reform of the judiciary and magistracy according to Chinese