Now the Vartikakara proceeds to refute the Buddhistic theory that Atman is none other than the momentary state of consciousness (Kshanika-Vijnana).
23. Be it known that Buddhi is but a momentary thing which comes and goes. Illumined only by Atman's reflection, it illumines the universe.
Buddhi cannot be Atman as depending on another for its light. This is explained as follows:
24. In Atman is Buddhi born, in Atman alone does it dissolve; non-existent before and after, by itself it does not exist.
The origin and the end of a thing cannot be perceived by itself; and these cannot be facts of experience unless perceived by some conscious entity. It being thus necessary that there should be a self-conscious entity perceiving the changes which the Buddhi undergoes from moment to moment, no further evidence is necessary to show that Buddhi is not Atman.
To avoid this difficulty some contend that Atman is not a single detached momentary state of consciousness; that, on the other hand, Atman is a stream of states of consciousness of an infinite
number running in a current, each preceding state of consciousness giving rise to the next succeeding one and vanishing away as the latter arises. This stream of consciousness has neither a beginning nor an end, though the individual states of consciousness of which it is a stream are momentary in themselves. Even this theory is open to objection:
25. If each preceding cognition should give rise to the next succeeding cognition, there would be a simultaneous presence of innumerable cognitions at every moment.
26. No cognition can give rise, subsequently to its disappearance, to another cognition; because it does not then exist.
The Vijnana-Vadin may be asked: Does the preceding cognition exist or not exist in the succeeding one to which it .gives rise? In the first case, all cognitions being momentary, in every cognition will be present all the preceding cognitions which are infinite in number: a conclusion opposed to experience. If this simultaneousness should be avoided, the Vijnana-Vadin will have to give up the hypothesis that each state of consciousness
exists for only one single moment. In the second case, i.e., if the preceding cognition does not exist in the succeeding one, it is tantamount to saying that each cognition arises out of nothing. If so, everything may come into existence at one and the same moment.
Why the aggregate of the body, etc., is not Atman.
26-27. Even supposing the aggregate of these be Atman: then when one part is severed, there could be no sentiency, because of the absence of an integral whole.