When two words in a sentence are put in apposition to each other, we are to understand that the things denoted by them can be predicated of each other. But the Isvara and Jiva, primarily denoted by the words 'that' and 'thou,' are so opposed to each other that neither can be predicated of the other. The unity of Jive, and Isvara taught in the Sruti is possible only when from each of them are eliminated such of the attributes as are opposed to those of the other, i.e., when we discard the primary sense of the words and understand them in a secondary sense.

The secondary sense of a word may either include or exclude the primary sense; or it may even include one part of the primary sense and exclude the other part. In the sentence 'That thou art.'

16-17. The secondary sense is not altogether exclusive of the primary sense, unlike that in the expression "a village on the Ganges"; nor is it altogether inclusive of the primary sense, unlike that in the expression "A white (i.e., a white horse) runs."

17-18. The secondary sense of sentences like "That thou art" is partial,--partially inclusive and partially exclusive of the primary sense,--like that of the sentence "He is this person," and the like.

In the above, the word 'Ganges ' which primarily means the stream has to be understood in the sense of 'the bank of the Ganges,' so that the whole of the primary sense is excluded. The word 'white' which primarily means 'white colour' has to be understood in the sense of 'a white horse,' so that the whole of the primary sense is included in the secondary. On the other hand, 'that' and 'thou' cannot be understood in either of the two ways. The primary sense of the word cannot be wholly lost sight of, since, then, there will be left

nothing of which unity can be predicated. Neither can it be wholly included, inasmuch as the mutual opposition between Jiva and Isvara will render it impossible to predicate a unity of them. When we eliminate from the primary sense of each word all that is alien to sentiency, which is common to both Isvara and Jiva, consciousness alone will be left; and thus the sentence 'That thou art' teaches the identity of Jiva and Isvara as the one indivisible, colourless, Absolute Consciousness.

18-19. The relation of apposition here (in vartika 15) spoken of consists in words of different origin referring all to one and the same thing.

The Sruti points to no sort of distinction between Jiva and Isvara.

1g-21. The sentence cannot mean that Jiva is either a part or a modification of the