[paragraph continues] Supreme, since, in the form of Jiva, He (Isvara) Himself has entered into the forms created by His own Maya. By Sruti as well as reason we are given to understand that He is partless and changeless, just as akasa in the jar is neither a part nor a modification of the infinite akasa.

The course of reasoning here referred to may be explained as follows: If Isvara, the First Cause, the Author of the Universe, were Himself made up of parts, He would have been preceded by those parts of which He was made. He would fall under the category of effects, and, as such, cannot constitute the Omniscient and Omnipotent Creator of the whole universe. Moreover, as an effect made of parts, He would have had a Creator preceding Him, and that other Creator would have had another preceding Him, and so on.

21. It cannot indeed mean mere praise, as does the sentence "thou art Indra."

When he who is not Indra is addressed as such, it is nothing hut a mere praise. The passage "That thou art" does not mean mere praise, because it occurs in a section which, interpreted

according to recognised principles of construction, points to nothing but absolute unity of Isvara and Jiva, and leaves no room for the alleged interpretation.

22. The passage cannot point to mere similarity, as the sentences like "The disciple is fire."

Nor does it signify a relation of cause and effect as does the sentence, "A pot is (mere) clay."

"The disciple is fire" means that the disciple is as pure as fire itself, and thus points to a similarity between the disciple and fire as regards purity. Similarity consists in one thing possessing some parts or attributes in common with another. Isvara being devoid of parts and attributes, He cannot be spoken of as similar to Jiva.

As devoid of parts, Isvara cannot be spoken of as actually giving rise to effects according to any of the theories of creation.

23 The sentence does not point to

a relation as genus and individual, as does the sentence "This lame (animal) is a Cow."

The sentences does not refer to a relation of substance and attributes, as does the phrase "the blue lotus."

The genus being regarded as insentient in itself, the sentient Isvara cannot be a genus.

If Jiva be an attribute of Isvara, then the latter would be a samsarin, of limited knowledge and power, subject to happiness and misery; which is opposed to the Sruti declaring that He is omniscient, etc. If, on the other hand, Isvara be an attribute of Jiva, then the Jiva would not be a samsarin; and all teaching as to bondage and liberation would be of no purpose.

24. Nor does the sentence point to mere contemplative worship, like the contemplating of idols as God.

Nor does the sentence imply mere courtesy as when a king's servant is addressed as king (by courtesy.)