From the preceding remarks it will be evident that I do not agree with Bhandarkar , who claims a late origin for Gainism, because, on some points, it entertains the same views as the Vaiseshika. The Vaiseshika philosophy may be briefly described as a philosophical treatment and systematical arrangement of those general concepts and ideas which were incorporated in the language, and formed therefore the mental property common to all who spoke or knew Sanskrit. The first attempts to arrive at such a natural philosophy may have been made at an early epoch; but the perfection of the system, as taught in the aphorisms of Kanada, could not be reached till after many centuries of patient mental labour and continuous philosophical discussion. In the interval between the origin and the final establishment of the system those borrowings may have taken place of which, rightly or wrongly, the Gainas may be accused. I must, however, remark that Bhandarkar believes the Gainas to hold, on the points presently to be discussed, a view 'which is of the nature of a compromise between the Sankhyas and the Vedantins on the one hand and the Vaiseshika on the other.' But for our discussion it makes no difference whether direct borrowing or a compromise between two conflicting views be assumed. The points in question are the following: (1) both Gainism and Vaiseshika embrace the Kriyavada, i.e. they maintain that the soul is directly affected by actions, passions, &c.; (2) both advocate the doctrine of asatkarya, i.e. that the product is different from its material cause, while the Vedanta and Sankhya hold that they are the same (satkarya); (g) that they distinguish qualities from their substratum (d navy a). The latter item has been discussed above; we have to deal, therefore, with the first two only. It will be seen that the opinions under (1) and (2) are the common-sense views; for that we are directly affected by passions, and that the product is different from its cause, e.g. the tree from the seed, will always and everywhere be the prima facie conclusion

of an unbiassed mind, or rather will appear as the simple statement of what common experience teaches. Such opinions cannot be regarded as characteristic marks of a certain philosophy, and their occurrence in another system need not be explained by the assumption of borrowing. The case would be different if a paradoxical opinion were found in two different schools; for a paradoxical opinion is most likely the product of but one school, and, when once established, it may be adopted by another. But such opinions of the Vaiseshika, as are the result of a peculiar train of reasoning, e.g. that space (dis) and air (akasa) are two separate substances, do not recur in Gainism. For in it, as well as in the older Brahmanical systems, Vedanta and Sankhya, space and air are not yet distinguished from one another, but akasa is made to serve for both.